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13 January 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the Director  
for Planning and Coordination

SUBJECT: Implementation of Killean Report

1. You requested that I examine CIA responsibilities for the implementation of the Killean Report and prepare such action as is necessary to insure that we at a later date do not show up in default of such obligations.

2. I have set forth below what I have been able to learn by numerous inquiries regarding what the status is of the various items and have then attached papers for your signature which will make the record clear to the various components of the Agency that they are responsible.

3. In NSC action of 4 August 1955, paragraph G (1), responsibility was specifically placed upon CIA:

"G. Examination of Peripheral War Problem: With respect to General Recommendation 11:

- (1) Noted that the proposal for a study of techniques and weapons technology for peripheral wars is being implemented through a study by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group and through a study under a CIA contract."

25X1A5a1 25X1A9a

Status: We are assured by [redacted] that [redacted] is on schedule in the development of the [redacted] which is to be completed at 25X1A5a1 the end of 1956. Consultation has proceeded between [redacted] and RAND 25X1A5a1 and between [redacted] and WSEG in matters which have a bearing on [redacted] and which are coincidentally in keeping with General Recommendation 11 but not initiated by it.

Action: No action required.

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4. The NSC action of 4 August also stated: "Noted that the responsible agencies have concurred either in full or (as indicated by an asterisk) with qualifications in the following recommendations and will implement them as indicated in their comments:". The specific recommendations are as follows:

a. Specific Recommendation C. 4:

"We need to examine intelligence data more broadly, or to invent some new technique, for the discovery of hoaxes. As a first step, we recommend a National Intelligence Estimate, with adequate safeguards, of our success in keeping secret our most useful techniques of intelligence. This estimate would suggest the extent to which an enemy might be manipulating the information obtained through these sources."

25X1A9a Status: [REDACTED] informs me that they have not made any progress on this matter though ONE is well aware that it has the responsibility. According to him, over ONE objections [REDACTED] assigned to ONE 25X1A9a this responsibility which they believe must belong to someone else.

Action: Recommend you sign memorandum attached.

b. Specific Recommendation C. 9:

"The growing principles and technology of information retrieval will advance and may revolutionize the handling of large masses of intelligence data. Their application should be sought out more actively."

Status: The IAC has established a sub-committee on the retrieval of intelligence data. The chairman is [REDACTED] of OCR and this 25X1A9a committee has been working on the matter.

Action: Recommend you sign attached memorandum to OCR.

c. Specific Recommendation C. 10:

"A heavy long-term investment should be made in the preparation of covert agents as eventual sources of high-level intelligence."

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25X1A9a **Status:** FI already had in process a number of steps related to this recommendation such as relocation of agents whose usefulness in their present locations had worn thin. I have been informed by [REDACTED] office that they are pleased with the progress they have made in keeping with this recommendation and would be glad to make a full status report on request.

**Action:** Recommend you sign the attached memorandum to DD/P.

d. General Recommendation 6 and Specific Recommendation C. 7:

25X1D **"GR 6:** The National Security Council establish policies and take actions which will permit the full exploitation of the intelligence and other advantages which can be [REDACTED]

25X1D **"C. 7:** We should take steps to develop the special equipment and specialized personnel needed for intelli- [REDACTED]

25X1A9a **Status:** Nothing has been done on this. The action paper attached should initiate the feasibility studies alluded to in our comment to the NSC. A Commander [REDACTED] in the SR Division is the man who has discussed this with Pentagon officials and probably would receive the assignment from [REDACTED] 25X1A9a

**Action:** Recommend you sign the action paper attached.

e. Specific Recommendation C. 3:

**"We must** find ways to increase the number of hard facts upon which our intelligence estimates are based, to provide better strategic warning, to minimize surprise in the kind of attack, and to reduce the danger of gross overestimation or gross underestimation of the threat. To this end, we recommend adoption of a vigorous program for the extensive use, in many intelligence procedures, of the most advanced knowledge in science and technology."

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25X1A

Status: Assuming this does not refer to the Project, I do not learn from OSI of any specific actions which have been taken, though [REDACTED] wanted to talk to you about this.

Action: Recommend you sign the attached action paper.

f. Specific Recommendation A. 9:

"As a first step in comparing the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the United States and the USSR in a possible nuclear air war, a comprehensive comparison of U.S. and USSR Bravo, Romeo, and Delta target systems be undertaken in the context of a single symmetric study, using common terms of reference and a common framework of analysis."

Status: By the Agency's comment it seems to await the initiative of someone else, presumably the Department of Defense. Within the Agency it would appear that ONE and OSI are mainly concerned.

Action: Recommend you sign the action paper attached. ✓

g. Specific Recommendation B. 12 c:

"Sea traffic plots should be established utilizing modern techniques for correlating, analyzing, storing and displaying traffic information gathered from both military and civilian sources. Traffic patterns as well as individual ship movements should be carefully watched."

Status: In its comment CIA accepts no responsibility.

Action: No action required

h. Specific Recommendation C. 1:

"Because we are unable to conclude that the United States ~~will~~, or surely will not, have useful strategic warning in the event of a surprise attack, we recommend that our planning take serious account of both possibilities."

Status: The Agency concurs in the statement made by the Department of Defense but does not specifically accept any responsibility.

Action: No action required

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i. Specific Recommendation C. 5:

"We require an automatic procedure to lower the security classification of certain information about enemy tactical capabilities and orders-of-battle as war starts."

Status: Unknown. Defense would have primary responsibility and Initiative.

Action: None required.

j. Specific Recommendation C. 6:

"There are generally recognized technical and administrative problems in the field of ELINT (electronic noise listening). This situation urgently needs attention. A combination of technical knowledge and adequate authority at a high level is required."

Status: IAC has established NSCID-17 which is presumed to be providing the necessary attention:

Action: Recommend you sign attached action memorandum.

k. Specific Recommendation C. 8:

"Intelligence applications warrant an immediate program leading to very small artificial satellites in orbits around the earth. Construction of large surveillance satellites must wait upon adequate solution to some extraordinary technical problems in the information gathering and reporting and its power of supply, and should wait upon development of the intercontinental ballistic missile rocket propulsion system. The ultimate objective of research and development on the large satellite should be continuous surveillance that is both extensive and selective and that can give fine scale detail sufficient for the identification of objects (airplanes, trains, buildings) on the ground."

Status: Unknown

Action: Recommend you sign attached action paper.

not sent

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